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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE OF UTAH 
---0000000---
JON D. WARNER aka JOHN D. WARNER 
and LEORA LARENE WARNER, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and 
Appell ants, BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
-vs-
ROBERT J. RASMUSSEN and 




STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
Appellants filed an action on December 3, 1981, against Respondents in 
the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County, seeking an equitable 
determination that the liquidated damage clause in Paragraph 16A of the 
Jniform Real Estate Contract between the parties was, under the particular 
circumstances, a penalty and thus unenforceable and for equitable reimburse-
ment of sums overpaid to the Respondents thereunder prior to Appellants' 
breach thereon. The case was tried before the Honoraole George E. Ballif, 
without jury, on January 12, 1983. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
After trial, the Court found, given the equities involved, the liquidated 
damages clause in Paragraph 16A of the Uniform Real Estate Contract of the 
parties was not a penalty out rather enforceable. The Court dismissed the 
Appellants' Complaint with prejudice and awarded Respondents their costs of 
Juagment was si9ned and entered on February 24, 1983. 
-1-
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek no relief on appeal. Respondents request this cOc' 
affinn decision of the Court below. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On August 16, 1979, Appellants entered into a Uniform Real Estate:: 
for the purchase of a home located at 263 East 74U North, Orem, Utah, fr 
the Respondents for $57 ,500.00. (0 Exhibit EX 9) 
Appellants defaulted on the monthly payments and returned the 
Respondents on July 31, 1981. (R 87; i: 24: 13-17; T 94: 15-16) 
Appellants occupied the home for a total of 23 1/2 months. (R 871 
During Appe 11 ants' occupancy , they paid $ l 3, 994. 25 on the contract. 
(R 86-87) Of this amount, which includes the Appellants' down payment o· 
$2,850.00 (0 Exhibit EX 9) only $5,039.35 was applied to reduce the 
and the balance was attributable to interest. (D Exhibit EX 10) 
Appell ants filed their Complaint on December 3, 1981, seeking equi:: 
reimbursement from Respondents. (R 3) 
A pre-trial conference was held on October 8, 1982. (R bY) 
At the pre-trial conference, the Court indicated its equitable 
tion would be based upon the guidelines provided by the Utah Supreme Cw 
the case of Perkins vs. Spencer, 243 P2d 416 (Utah and suosequent 
in Utah interpreting said decision. (R 86; PT 2: 17-25; PT 3: 1-3) 
On January 12, 1983, trial was held before the Honorable George E, 
Ballif, without a jury. (R 81) 
Appellants were present with counsel and Respondent, Rooert J. 
was present with Respondents' counsel. l K tll I 
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Appellants, two expert witnesses, Respondent, Robert J. Rasmussen, and 
three other witnesses testified at the request of Appellants. Respondent, 
Robert J. Rasmussen, testified for the Respondents. (R 81) 
On February 4, 1983, in its written decision, the Court found the 
liquidated damages clause in Paragraph 16A of the parties' Uniform Real Estate 
Contract was not a penalty and therefore enforceable. (R 145-148) The Court 







Appellants abandoned the property when they could not meet the 
payment schedule, gave notice and peacefully surrendered posses-
sion after 2J 1/2 months of occupancy from August 1979 to July 
of 1981. (R 146); 
It required a total of 51 days after Appellants vacated before 
Respondents were able to re-rent the premises at the rate of 
$450.00 a month giving an option to the renter to purchase for 
$56,000.00, with credit for $100.00 of each montn's rent against 
the purchase price at the time the option was exercised. (R 146); 
Appellants were not entitled to credits for claimed improvements 
made because 
al evidence was conflicting as to the value, 
bl evidence was conflicting as to the extent, and 
cl no new space was added to the home. (R 146); 
Respondents were not entitled to an amount for their claim of 
waste as they failed to persuade the Court they were entitled 
to it. (R 146); 
Respondents could show damages using Appellants' "reasonable 
rental value" of $325.00 a month in the sum of $7,637.00. 
(R 146-147) However, under the case law of the State of Utah, 
Respondents were entitled to the amount of interest received 
under the contract as an item of damages upon ten11ination; and, 
in this respect, Respondents were entitled to an item of damages 
in excess of $10,575.00 for loss of interest under the contract. 
For this proposition, the Court cited Johnson vs. Carman, 572 
P2d 371 (Utah 1977). (R 147); 
In addition to the amount of $10,575.00, the Court stated 
Respondents were entitled to the sum of $594.00 damages for 
Appellants' breach. The amount was computed upon the Court's 
finding it required Respondents 51 days to rent the home after 
Appellants' breach and that the reasonable rental value during 
this time was $350.00 a month. (R 147); 
-J-
7 l The Court found the value of the home did not advance over :· 
purchase price of $57 ,5UU.OO during the Appellants' term ot 
occupancy and remained approximately the same. (R 147); and 
8) In addition to the actual damages sustained Dy the Respondenr 
due to the Appellants' breach, $11,169.0U, the Court found t;. 
s fees which Respondents incurred in defending this 
action and the expense of re-renting or re-selling the 
which may ultimately require a real estate commission of over 
$2,500.0U are real and undeterminable additional damages whk 
have a reasonable probability of occurring. (R 147-148) 
The Appellants, in their Statement of Facts, indicate and would havt 
this Court believe the balance of the equities involved weigh in their fa, 




Appell ants did not improve the property during their occupanc, 
any appreciable way. Appellants' witness testified of no rea· 
change in value of the home during their occupancy. (T 10: 
32-25, T 11: 1-25, T 12: 1-4; T 12: 17-25, T 13: 1-19) 
Appellants' witness testified the quality of the Appellants' 
al 1 eged improvements were of an "unfinished" nature. (T 64: 
3-18) Appellants' witness testified the quality of some oft· 
Appellants' alleged improvements were of "poor" quality. (1: 
6-17) Many of the Appellants' alleged improvements were mere 
a matter of personal preference. (T 84: 1-9; T 85: 3-9; T 
10-25, T 86: 1-7; T 86: 8-20; T 86: 21-25, T 87: 1-8; T 8b 
18-25, T 89: 1-3; T 89: 4-15) 
If Appellants repaired and maintained the property during the 
occupancy, said repairs and maintenance were nothing more tha 
nominal in nature. (T 21: lb-19, T 89: 16-25, T 90: 1-41 
Upon surrendering the premises, Appellants failed to 
clean the carpet in the subject property. (T 80: 13-22) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE WERE NO IMPROPRIETIES IN THE DISPOSITION OF 
THIS CASE IN THE COURT BELOW AS IT RELATED TO THE 
PRE-TRIAL AND PRE-TRIAL ORDER. 
At the pre-trial conference and in the Pre-Trial Order which was a 
of the pre-trial, the Court indicated its equitable aetermination would 
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based upon the guidelines provided by the Utah Supreme Court in the case of 
Perkins vs. Spencer, Supra, and subsequent cases in Utah interpreting said 
decision. (R 86; PT 2: 7-25; PT 3: 1-3) 
Due to the fact the issue in Perkins vs. Spencer, Supra, as well as in 
the case now before the Court involve an equitable determination, there are 
no "hard and fast" rules of application for resolution. Instead, each case 
must be considered upon its own merits to achieve equitable resolution. It 
is for this reason, there are many cases in this jurisdiction interpreting 
and modifying Perkins vs. Spencer, Supra. The Appellants' brief has done a 
find job in bringing the volume of cases to the attention of the Court. 
It cannot fairly be said then that the Court below erred in any way by 
not following its Pre-Trial Order. In fact, the Court below did follow its 
stated intention that its equitable determination would be based upon the· 
guidelines provided by the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Perkins vs. 
Spencer, Supra, and subsequent cases in Utah interpreting said decision. 
POINT II 
THE COURT BELOW DID NOT ERR IN FINDING, UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES 
OF THIS CASE, THE LIQUIDATED DAMAGES CLAUSE IN PARAGRAPH 16A OF 
THE UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT OF THE PARTIES WAS NOT 
A PENALTY BUT RATHER ENFORCEABLE. 
The Court below, based upon the evidence presented at trial, and within 
its discretion, properly found the liquidated damages clause in Paragraph 16A 
of the parties' Uniform Real Estate Contract was not an unenforceable penalty. 
In speaking of the guidelines provided by Perkins vs. Spencer, Supra, the 
Utah Supreme Court stated: these are reasonable factors to determine 
damages, [but] they were not meant to be a rigid formula to be applied 
-S-
mechanically in every case. In determining equitable damages, the trial. 
may use whatever factors it finds most appropriate to achieve justice." 
Johnson vs. Carman, Supra, at 374. (Underscoring supplied for emphasis.) 
It is now for the Utah Supreme Court to determine whether or not the 
Court below abused its discretion in any way amounting to a reversible err 
The Court below properly found it required a total of 51 days after 
Appellants vacated before Respondents were able to re-rent the premises. 
Appellants assert Respondents allowed the house to remain vacant for 51 a; 
before they made any attempts to e1ther resell or rent it. This is clear' 
not supported by the record. Respondent, Robert J. Rasmussen, did testif) 
approximately one month and a half past from the time the Appellants 
the house until attempts were made. (T 93: 5-19) The trial Court was 
clearly within its discretion to find that this was not an unreasonably 
long time for the Respondents to prepare the house for resale or rental a' 
make whatever decisions were necessary regarding use of the home. 
The Court below properly found Appellants were not entitled to credi'. 
for claimed improvements made because the evidence was conflicting as to 
their value and their extent. Appellants' witness testified no real chan: 
in value accrued to the home during Appellants' occupancy. (T lU: 23-15 
T ll: 1-25, T 12: 1-4; T 12: 17-25, T 13: 1-19) Appellants' witness 
testified the quality of the Appellants' alleged improvements were of an 
"unfinished" nature. (T 64: 3-18) Appellants' witness testified the quo 
of some of the Appellants' alleged improvements was of "poor" quality. 
(T 66: 6-17} Respondent testified that if there were any improvements' 
the home made by Appellants, the value of same was approximately $3Uu.uu. 
(T 90: 18-21) Respondent testified many of the Appellants' alleged i 1W 
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ments were merely a matter of personal preference. (T 84: 1-9; T 85: 3-19; 
T 85: lU-25, T 86: 1-7; T 86: 8-20; T 86: 21-25, T 87: 1-8; T 8d: 18-
25, T 89: 1-3; T 89: 4-15) The trial Court was again clearly within its 
discretion to find Appellants were not entitled to credits for claimed 
improvements made. 
The Court below properly found that Respondents had sustained actual 
damages in the total sum of $11 ,169.00. Using Appellants' "reasonable rental 
value" of $325.00 a month (T 54: 24-5, T 55: 1-5) the trial Court found 
Respondents were entitled to the sum of $594.00 damages for the 51 days in 
which the Respondents' house stood vacant after Appellants' surrender. It 
should be noted in passing, that Appellants own expert as well as Respondent, 
Robert J. Rasumssen, testified the reasonable rental value of Respondents' 
home at the time of Appellants' surrender was $350.UO a month. (T 56: 6-9; 
T 95: 5-18) Nonetheless, the trial Court did not abuse discretion in finding 
damages in the amount of $594.00 on this particular point. 
The trial Court also did not err in finding the Respondents were entitled 
to the sum of $10,575.00 for loss of interest or rent under the contract. 
Under the terms of the parties' Uniform Real Estate Contract, Respondents 
were entitled to annual interest at the rate of 10 1/2%. Rent and interest 
are, in reality, one in the same and, therefore, cannot and should not both 
be included in the measure of damages; fair rental value necessarily repre-
sents, however, a reasonable return (interest) on investment. Biesinger vs. 
584 801 (Utah 1978). The trial Court was completely within its 
discretion to use the interest figure rather than the fair rental value in 
computing Respondents' damages if it felt it was the more equitable factor. 
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The Court below properly found the value of the home did not advance 
over the purchase price of $57 ,500.00 during the Appellants' occupancy an. 
remained approximately the same. Appellants' expert witness, Lynn Leiflo 
testified it was his expert opinion the value of the home, "if anything, 
stayed the same" during the Appellants' occupancy. (T ll: 13-15; T 13: 
7-19; T 14: 9-14) Appellants' expert witness, Richard Rawson, testified 
was his opinion the value of the home at the time of Appellants' surrender 
was pursuant to the market date approach $58,000.00 (T SO: 2-5), pursuant 
the income approach $57,750.00 (T 51: 2-3), and pursuant to the marketva 
approach $58,000.00 (T 52: 11-15). 1he trial Court did not abuse its 
discretion in finding the value of the home did not advance during Appella 
occupancy. 
The Court below properly found in addition to the Respondents' 
damages of $ll,l69.00, resulting from Appellants' breach, Respondents inc; 
attorney's fees in defending this action and the expense of renting or 
reselling the property, which may ultimately require a real estate cornrnis! 
of over $2,500.00, all of which are real but undeterminable additional dar 
which have a reasonable probability of occurring. 
Appellants in their brief raise the concern, that for the Court to 
consider attorney's fees for defending as an element of damage, it grants 
Respondents double recovery. This would only be true if the trial Courtr 
awarded Respondents their reasonable attorney's fees. It did not and, tni· 
fore, it is a proper element for consideration in the determination 
enforceability of the liquidated damages clause of Paragraph 16A. 
Biesinger vs. Behunin, id. 
-d-
The Utah Supreme Court has held many times a liquidated damages clause 
is voidable and unenforceable if penal in nature rather than a reasonable 
estimation of actual and contemplated damages. This proposition is well 
supported by citation in Appellants' brief Pages 12 and 13 and therefore will 
not be cited here. In 1982, the Supreme Court stated: 
•.. The damages recoverable for a breach are those which arise 
naturally from the breach and which reasonably may oe supposed to 
have been within the contemplation of the parties or are reasonably 
foreseeable. Robbins vs. Finlay, 645 P2d 623, 625 {Utah 1982). 
Attorney's fees and other miscellaneous contemplated expenses associated with 
renting and re-selling property surrendered under breach of the buyers 
naturally arise out of said breach and should have been reasonably contemplated 
by the parties or reasonably foreseeable by the parties at the time of 
executing the Uniform Real Estate Contract. 
Attorney's fees as well as such miscellaneous contemplated expenses are 
by their very nature, as are as well, actual damages, speculative in nature 
and void of exact computation when parties execute their agreements. It is 
not until a breach occurs by the buyer, as here, that actual damages begin to 
focus and become clear. Still, at this point, there may well be certain 
damages which, in the words of the trial Court, are additional expenses which 
a non-breaching party may incur which at time of trial can only be estimated 
but are, nonetheless, real undeterminable additional damages which have a 
reasonable probability of occurring as a result of the breaching party's 
conduct. The trial Court should not and cannot ignore these contemplated 
damages -- attorney's fees and miscellaneous expenses associated with renting 
or resel lin9 surrendered property. Attorney's fees, even if awarded, are 
somewhat speculative due to the fact a party never knows what it will take 
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to collect judgment and whether an appeal will be filed. The trial Cour· 
must consider them in order to do justice to all parties and in order L 
determine an equitable resolution. If the present renters of the home 1 
question do not exercise their option to purchase, Respondents may very. 
be faced with a real estate commission in excess of $2,500.00 that they. 
not have had "but for" Appellants' breach. Respondents have incurred at 
fees and continue to rlo so, the total of which has not yet been detemiM 
In the instant case, the trial Court did not abuse its discretionc· 
considering in its determination of an equitable resolution, additional 
expenses which the Respondents incurred as· a result of Appellants' brew 
for which no exact amount could be set at time of trial. 
Based on the equities involved in this case, the payments made by 
Appellants and the damages of the Respondents are as follows: 
Payments by Appellants: 
Respondents' actual damages as determined 
by the trial Court: 
Respondents' contemplated real but, 
as yet, undeterminable additional 
damages which have a reasonable 
probability of occuring: 
CONCLUSION 
$13,994.25 
11 'l 69 .uu 
$ 2 ,825 .25 
2 ,SOU .00 · 
The Court below did not commit irreversible error. Its decision wa 
supported by evidence properly admitted at trial. The Appellants have t 
on every front to show the trial Court disregarded the evidence or abus· 
discretion in any way. Appellants are not entitled to the relief they' 
Respondents ask this Court to affirm the trial Court's decision. 
- l J -
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